Peace Agreement Of War

What can international actors do to prevent this war from happening again if opponents of the civil war sign a peace agreement? It`s a matter of life and death for millions of people. The two worst explosions of mass violence of the 1990s – Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 – followed the failure of the peace agreement to end these wars. In both cases, death and destruction were shocking: an estimated 350,000 people died in Angola and 800,000 died in Rwanda. The war lasted eight years in Liberia and claimed the lives of 150,000 people because several peace agreements failed to end civil wars. In 2001, after the failure of the peace accords, two other countries were again at war — Angola and Sierra Leone. There is also another line of scientific study that studies the impact of ideological fluctuations on the implementation of peace agreements. According to Wolford (2007), new governments tend to be rather reluctant to implement the agreements of their predecessors, especially when the ideological orientation of a sitting statesman differs from that of the previous regime. Danzell (2011) said that right-wing governments are restricting democratic space and pushing left-wing and marginalized political parties into conflict. Similarly, Clare (2014) finds that supporters of left-wing parties are more draconian and willing to punish leaders who have a belligerent attitude, while a right-wing electoral base rewards aggressive politics. Another important set of cases concerned ECOWAS and the endless willingness of its partners to virtually abolish peace agreements after their provisions were violated by a political group or group at war. This followed the planning of a new peace agreement aimed at appeasing the recalcitrant faction. Charles Taylor took full advantage of ECOWAS` willingness to face its whims and whims, in violation of one peace agreement at a time.

The resulting effect has been the ongoing process of drafting new peace agreements. Nixon asked the eminent Asian-American politician Anna Chennault to be his “channel to Mr. Thieu”; Chennault agreed and regularly reported to John Mitchell that Thieu had no intention of attending a peace conference. On November 2, Chennault told the South Vietnamese ambassador: “I just heard from my boss in Albuquerque, who says his boss [Nixon] is going to win. And you`ll tell your boss [Thieu] to hold on for a while longer. [8] Johnson learned about the NSA and was furious that Nixon had “blood on his hands” and that Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen agreed with Johnson that such an action was a “betrayal.” [9] [10] [11] Defence Minister Clark Clifford considered this to be an unlawful violation of the Logan Act. [12] In response, President Johnson ordered the listening of members of the Nixon campaign. [13] [14] Dallek wrote that Nixon`s efforts “probably made no difference” because Thieu was unwilling to participate in the talks and there was little chance of reaching an agreement before the elections; However, his use of the information provided by Harlow and Kissinger was morally questionable and Vice President Hubert Humphrey`s decision not to make Nixon`s actions public is “an unusual act of political decency.” [15] Another factor related to the limitations of the peacekeeping force`s (ECOMOG) capabilities.

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